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CAN WE RATIONALLY LEARN TO COORDINATE? ~ 
ABSTRACT. In this paper we examine the issue whether individual rationality 
considerations are sufficient to guarantee that individuals will learn to coordinate. 
This question is central in any discussion of whether social phenomena (read: 
conventions) can be explained in terms of a purely individualistic approach. We 
argue that he positive answers to this general question that have been obtained in 
some recent work require assumptions which incorporate some convention. This 
conclusion may be seen as supporting the viewpoint of 'institutional individualism' 
in contrast to 'psychological individualism'. 
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tion, conventions. 
"We must remember that a pattern whether 
of the past or of the future is always arbi- 
trary or partial in that there could always 
be a different one or a further elaboration 
of the same one." 
(C. Palliser, Quincunx, 1989, Book V: The 
Maliphants, Part V). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many situations in every day life can be understood in the framework 
of coordination problems. Familiar examples include which side of 
the road to drive on, whether or not to call back once the connection 
of  a telephone conversation has suddenly broken and, in the context 
of  economics, what type of commodity to carry in your pocket as a 
medium of exchange. The typical feature of these and other coordi- 
nation problems is that the optimal action of every individual agent 
crucially depends on the action that is chosen by the other agent(s). 
Moreover, there are two or more (Nash equilibrium) combinations 
at which each agent's action is optimal given the actions of the other 
agents. Finally, the agents are often indifferent between the different 
equilibrium combinations. Accordingly, there is a strong sense in 
which the best course of action is undetermined. 
Theory and Decision 40: 29--49, 1996. 
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Experience suggests that people in 'real' coordination problems 
are, on the whole, very well able to coordinate their actions. It 
seems that for every particular problem some actions 'stand out' 
compared to the other possible actions and that people tend to use 
the actions that stand out. At the theoretical level, this has lead to 
investigations into the nature of 'salience' (Schelling, 1960) and 
'conventions' (Lewis, 1969). The integration of these concepts into 
the individualistic language of game theory in which the coordi- 
nation problems are cast has turned out to be rather problemat- 
ic, however. Two questions have attracted some attention in this 
respect. First, how do the notions of salience and convention relate 
to the view that individual agents choose their actions in a ratio- 
nal way? (See, e.g., Gauthier, 1975 and Gilbert, 1989.) Second, 
can the notions of salience and convention themselves be grounded 
on rationality principles? (See, e.g., Bacharach, 1991 and Sugden, 
1992.) 
One might argue that these questions are inherently difficult to 
address in a static context and in this paper we take a slightly dif- 
ferent perspective by investigating whether individual agents can 
learn, in a rational way, to coordinate their actions if the coordi- 
nation problem that they face is a repeated one. If this were the 
case, the second question above could be answered in the affir- 
mative, i.e., a convention could be said to emerge from a ratio- 
nal learning process. Another rationale for adopting a dynamic 
perspective is that it is generally believed that although individ- 
ual agents might not be able to solve a particular coordination 
problem at once, they will learn to coordinate actions after some 
time. 
This paper will argue that individual rationality considerations 
are not sufficient to ensure that individual agents learn to coordi- 
nate. On the contrary, some form of common background (conven- 
tion) has to be assumed for rational earning to coordinate to take 
place. The conclusion that we draw from this analysis for the indi- 
vidualistic program underlying much of the social sciences is in 
line with the position defended by Agassi (1960); see also Janssen 
(1993). He argues, in our view convincingly, against a psycholog- 
ical form of individualism and in favor of an institutional form of 
individualism. According to the latter view, the aim of the indi- 
vidualistic program is "neither to assume the existence of all co- 
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ordination or to explain all of them, but rather to assume the exis- 
tence of some co-ordination in order to explain the existence of 
some other co-ordination" (Agassi, 1960, p. 263). We will argue 
that some conventions have to exist in order to explain the emer- 
gence of other conventions. In recent papers (Goyal and Janssen, 
1993a,b) we have followed this approach in developing formal mod- 
els to study questions of inertia and dynamic stability of conven- 
tions. 
The above point of view might appear to be in conflict with the 
general idea behind recent papers by Crawford and Haller (1990) 
and Kalai and Lehrer (1993). We will discuss these papers in some 
detail while developing our argument. Crawford and Haller argue 
that there are optimal rules of learning to coordinate. These opti- 
mal rules themselves are, however, in general not unique and, in 
our view, this non-uniqueness problem can only be resolved by 
positing the existence of a coordinating convention at a higher lev- 
el. Kalai and Lehrer, on the other hand, show that under some 
restrictions on prior beliefs, Bayesian ('rational') learning leads 
in the long run to Nash equilibrium. Applying this result to our 
context might suggest hat Bayesian learning leads to individu- 
al agents playing one of the pure Nash equilibria of the coordi- 
nation game. We will argue that the restrictions on prior beliefs 
that they require implicitly assume a conventional selection of pri- 
ors. 
Another conclusion one might draw from our analysis is that the 
perfect rationality paradigm isnot very powerful when it comes to the 
study of interactive l arning processes. Instead, one could resort o 
models of boundedly rational behavior or evolutionary models. We 
think recent developments (cf., Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993) 
within these approaches are interesting, but they fall outside the 
scope of the present paper. Here, we focus on the issue to what extent 
learning by perfectly rational agents can ensure coordination. 
In order to be able to state our argument with some care, we 
have to give definitions of the basic terms that are used. This will be 
done in Section 2. Section 3 contains the discussion of the problems 
rational individual agents face while learning to coordinate. Sections 
4 and 5 examine the papers by Crawford and Haller (1990) and Kalai 
and Lehrer (1993a), respectively. Section 6 concludes with a brief 
comparison of the two approaches. 
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2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS 
In order to concentrate on issues of coordination we will consider 
pure coordination games only. In a pure coordination game there is 
no conflict of interest; the only aim of the players is to coordinate. 
For notional simplicity we will restrict ourselves to the two players 
case. Most of the time we also restrict attention to the simplest 
coordination game, namely the following two action game: 
L R  (/1,1t (o,o/) 
/3\(0,0) 
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (T, L) and (/3, R). 
In the discussion of Crawford and Haller (1990) in Section 4 we 
will also consider a k action coordination game, where the pay- 
off matrix is the k x k identity matrix. Denote the row player and 
the column player as 1 and 2, respectively. The two players are 
playing this game an infinite number of times. Let 8 E [0, 1) denote 
the common discount factor. The players observe all actions and 
the resulting pay-offs, i.e., history is completely observable. We 
also assume that players have perfect recall. The players cannot 
communicate except via their actions. 2 These assumptions and the 
rationality of the players are assumed to be common knowledge. 
It is possible that the two players might choose one of the two 
coordination equilibria by chance. If, for example, in period ~ player 1 
1 
chooses T with probability ~ and player 2 chooses L with probability 
1 1 ~, then the chance of coordination in period f will be equal to g. 
Moreover, if the two players keep playing these mixed strategies, 
then for any finite number of times the game is actually played, 
the chance that they have coordinated at every instance is strictly 
positive. This type of 'coordination' is unsatisfactory, however. What 
one wants is that coordination is ensured, not that there is a (small) 
probability that it might result. Also, it is not clear what the players 
learn when they constantly play this mixed strategy. 
In order to clarify what we mean by 'learning to coordinate', 
we introduce the following (standard) notation and definitions. A
(behavior) strategy 3 of player i in period t is a function s~ 9 H --+ 
A(Ai), where H is the set of all possible histories, A(Ai) denotes 
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the set of probability distributions over Ai and A1 = {T, B} and 
A2 = {L, R}. Thus, a strategy specifies how a player randomizes 
over his actions after all possible histories. We denote by 7r~ (sl, s2) 
the discounted sum of expected pay-offs of player i, if strategies s i 
and S 2 are played, i.e., 
O(3 
~li (8 i, $2) = ( i  -- ~) Z E(Sl,S2) ~t7i{ (a,l (t), a2 (t)) i=I,2, 
t=l 
where ai (t) 9 Ai is the action of player i in period t and 7ri (al (t), a2 (~)) 
is the stage-game pay-off of player i in period t. 
Player i's belief about player - i ' s  strategy is denoted by #~, 
where #i : H ~ A (Ai). Such a belief specifies how player i expects 
player - i  to randomize over his actions after any possible history. 
Note that the possibility for learning about he other player's trategy 
is incorporated in the belief. 
Given the above definitions of strategies and beliefs, the notion 
of individual rational behavior that is employed in this paper is a 
traditional one. A strategy s~ is said to be individually rational if 
there is a belief #~ such that (i) s~ maximizes the discounted sum 
of expected pay-offs given #~ and (ii) #~ is 'consistent' with all 
information gathered throughout history. For the moment, we restrict 
ourselves to a very general notion of consistency according to which 
a belief should be such that at any point in time the observed history 
up to that time should have been possible given a player's own 
strategy and this belief. Other notions of consistency, like Bayesian 
updating, will be introduced later. 
We are now ready to define the basic concept of 'coordination'. 
Coordination is regarded as a property of a pair of strategies as 
follows. 
DEFINITION 1. A pair of strategies {sl, 32} is coordinated if for 
any c > 0 there is a finite t*(c) such that for all t > t*(G), 
P[(a,(t) ,a2(t))  = (T,L)l(Sl,S2)] > 1 -c  or 
a2(0)  = (B ,  > 1 - 
The expression P[(a.l(t),a2(t)) = (T,L)l(Sl,S2)] in the above def- 
inition has to be read as the probability that the action combination 
(T, L) is played in period t given that the players have chosen the 
strategy combination (s l, s2). 
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Two elements of this definition are worth emphasizing. First, we 
say that a pair of strategies i  coordinated only if one of the two pure 
strategy equilibria is played from some finite time period onwards 
with very high probability. A pair of strategies which results, for 
example, in alternating between (T, L) and (B, R) therefore does 
not satisfy this requirement. We have opted for this formulation, 
because we want to investigate owhat extent aconvention to play 
the stage game can emerge out of a process in which rational players 
learn while playing the game. Second, we do not require that there 
is a finite period after which the players always play the same pure 
strategy equilibrium. This is done in order to take account of the 
possibility that players randomize until a certain, somehow desired, 
outcome (for example, (T, L)) in the stage game is obtained and 
play pure strategies ever after (cf., Section 4). For every finite peri- 
od there is always a (small) chance that they have not reached the 
desired outcome if they choose to play such a strategy. 
3. THE PROBLEM STATED 
In the previous ection we have not discussed the learning process 
itself: how do rational individuals earn? It is clear that he strategies 
that players can rationally choose do not change over time, if the 
beliefs #i about future plays of the opponent that are consistent with 
past observations do not change. This suggests that the problem of 
learning in games is of the following type: what can the players infer 
about he future on the basis of a finite number of observations? Can 
they become more certain about future plays of the opponent the 
more observations they have about he opponent's past play? This 
is, of course, very similar to the well-known Problem of Induction. 
In the present context, however, there is an additional problem. An 
agent should take into account he possibility that the opponent's 
play is not stationary, because she (the opponent) is also learning 
about he strategies he is playing and will try to adjust optimally. 
Two notions of learning that are frequently employed in game 
theory and in economics are adaptive (Cournot) learning and 'sta- 
tionary' (Bayesian) learning (cf., Eichberger et al., 1993). 4 For 
the present purposes, both notions are unsatisfactory, because they 
assume in one way or another that an individual player takes the 
other player's tage game strategy as stationary. This is something 
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they know to be false, since they know their opponent is learning at 
the same time. 
A notion of learning that is more satisfactory inthis respect is the 
notion of sophisticated learning introduced by Milgrom and Roberts 
(1991). They show that he stage game strategies ofwhat they regard 
as sophisticated learners converge to the set of iteratively undom- 
inated strategies. Applying their results (especially Theorem 5) to 
our context yields the conclusion that sophisticated learning cannot 
ensure coordination. The idea, basically, is that an uncoordinated 
pair of strategies as, for example, {s l, $2 } = {B/~B.. . ,  L LL.. .  }, 
where t3BB stands for 'always B' is consistent with sophisticated 
learning, because at any time each player can consistently forecast 
that the other player will see that it is in his or her interest to switch 
actions the next time period, i.e., nothing prevents player 1 from 
expecting player 2 to play R the next period after having observed 
a finite number of L's. It is then rational to continue to play B. 
One might wish to argue that the notion of sophisticated learn- 
ing is not an appropriate notion of rational learning in the present 
context if {BBB. . . ,  LLL...} is a pair of strategies that is con- 
sistent with sophisticated learning. Indeed, it seems reasonable to 
assume that in an infinitely repeated game the players will reach one 
of the coordination equilibria t least once. So, let us consider the 
question of what the players are able to infer after having reached 
a pure strategy equilibrium of the stage game. We argue that the 
strategic uncertainty the individual players face in deciding upon 
their strategy at period t + 1 is basically the same whether or not 
they have reached a coordination equilibrium at period t. Suppose 
the players have played (T, L) in period ~. For the players individ- 
ually there is no way of knowing whether they have coordinated 
on a pair of strategies {s~,s2} = {TBTB, . . . ,LRLR. . .}  or on 
{Sl, s2} = {TTTT,. . . ,  LLLL.. .} or on still other pairs of strate- 
gies that could possibly have resulted in the action combination 
(T, L) in period t. Accordingly, it is possible that one of the players 
thinks that they will alternate deterministically between (T, L) and 
(/3, R), while the other player thinks that they will continue playing 
(T, L). This means that after (T, L) has occurred in period t, the play- 
ers may find themselves at(B, L) in period t+ 1. The same is true for 
any number of times they have reached acoordination equilibrium. 
In other words, on the basis of only a finite number of observations 
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the players cannot ascertain what he other player will do in the (near) 
future, i.e., the players face the well-known problem that at any point 
in time there is an infinite number of hypotheses that is consistent 
with past observations (each of these hypotheses having different 
implications for expected future play). We will call the problem that 
the players do not know which hypothesis touse for predicting future 
opponent's play the Projection problem (after Goodman, 1973). 
The argument we are putting forward is very much like an argu- 
ment recently made by Gilbert (1990). Gilbert (p. 10) argues that 
"common knowledge of precedent as such will not by itself auto- 
matically generate expectation fconformity". The reason she offers 
is that after having coordinated before, a rational agent will infer that 
it is best to conform to precedent if and only if his opponent will do 
likewise. He will realize that his opponent does not have an inde- 
pendent reason for conforming to precedent either. Therefore, there 
is nothing inherently rational in conforming to precedent. 
In this section we have argued that the essential problem in ratio- 
nal learning to coordinate lies in the difficulty of making inferences 
about future play on the basis of past play. The fact that people often 
seem to think they can learn from past experience might suggest 
that our argument is too agnostic to provide an accurate account of 
how rational agents behave in repeated coordination situations. This 
motivates our discussion Of two other approaches which try to ensure 
coordination by imposing more structure on the interactive l arning 
process. 
4. APPROACH I: EXTENDED RATIONALITY AND NO COMMON 
LANGUAGE 
The approach considered in this section is based on a paper by 
Craw ford and Haller (1990), henceforth C&H, who extend the notion 
of rationality in coordination games and introduce a 'no common 
language' assumption. We will introduce their ideas below and look 
at the consequences of their approach for the problems we have 
indicated in the previous ection. 
Extended Rationality 
C&H "maintain the working hypothesis that players play an optimal 
... attainable strategy combination" (p. 580). They define an attain- 
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able strategy combination as a pair of strategies in which each play- 
er's 'undistinguished' actions enter his overall strategy in a symmet- 
ric way and in which players whose positions are 'undistinguished' 
play identical strategies. An optimal attainable strategy combination 
is an attainable strategy combination that maximizes both player's 
repeated-game pay-offs. For the moment, we will assume that play- 
ers have a common language in which they describe the game so 
that the players' actions are distinguished and all strategy combina- 
tions are attainable. In this case, C&H's working hypothesis reduces 
to the players choosing an optimal strategy combination, i.e., they 
coordinate immediately. 
The idea of players choosing an optimal strategy combination 
is similar to a suggestion by Sugden (1991) who proposes that in 
coordination games, players be regarded as a team in a game against 
nature. As a member of a team, each rational player should individ- 
ually think of a strategy combination which, if both players did their 
part, would optimize their individual (and collective) pay-offs. We 
will call this notion 'individual rationality in the extended sense', 
because this notion defines rational behavior in such a way as to 
include a belief of a 'good' strategy of the other player. This extend- 
ed notion of individual rationality is, we think, quite natural in pure 
coordination games, because players know that it is in their mutual 
interest to coordinate. Hence, it is reasonable to expect 'good will' 
on the part of the opponent. The notion of extended rationality is 
a generalization of the Principle of Coordination to the context of 
repeated games. This principle says that in coordination games with 
a strict Pareto-best equilibrium, each player should do his or her part 
in it (see, e.g., Gauthier, 1975 and Bacharach, 1991). 
We now formally state the definition of'extended individual ratio- 
nality' and distinguish it from 'collective rationality'. We will make 
this distinction i  order to be able to express what it means for players 
to choose a strategy combination. 
DEFINITION 2. A strategy si is individual rational in the extended 
sense if it is part of a pair of strategies { i, s_i } such that for i = 1,2, 
for all strategies s'~, s;~ of players i and - i .  
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DEFINITION 3. A pair of strategies {sl, 82 } is collectively rational 
if 
7ri(s,,s2) /> 7ri(Jl,s;), i=  1,2, 
for all strategies s], s~ of players 1 and 2. 
The difference between the two definitions i  that only the second 
definition requires ome collective action to be undertaken. The first 
definition requires the players individually to come up with a 'team' 
solution (pair of strategies) that would be optimal for both. Each 
player should then perform his part of the team solution. The two 
definitions yield the same outcomes if and only if there is a unique 
pair of strategies that is collectively rational. In this case, both players 
will necessarily find the same solution to the 'team problem' and 
the definition of extended individual rationality prescribes that the 
players perform their part of this pair of strategies. Since, typically, 
there are many pairs of strategies that are collectively rational, every 
individual player of 'good will' can choose his or her part of a 
different pair of such strategies. Accordingly, coordination is not 
ensured. 
The fact that in the case of a common language C&H's approach 
yields a coordinated outcome from the first period onwards is due to 
their implicit assumption that players choose a pair of strategies that 
is collectively rational, i.e., our definition of collective rationality 
coincides with their hypothesis that players play an optimal attain- 
able strategy combination. This is exemplified by their saying that 
players can use "their perfect recall and knowledge of the structure 
of the game to maintain coordination forever once they locate a pair 
of coordinated actions. They can do this either by repeating those 
actions, or by alternating deterministically between them and the 
other coordinated pair" (p. 575). As Crawford and Haller (and we) 
assume that communication is not possible except by playing the 
game, we think that players individually cannot maintain coordina- 
tion once they have reached acoordination equilibrium of the stage 
game. It is precisely because both 'repeating the same action as in 
the last period' and 'choose the action that you didn't choose in the 
last period' are collectively rational that player 1 might think that 
player 2 will repeat her action, while player 2 might hink that player 
1 alternates his action deterministically. Thus, it is not certain that 
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rational players will maintain coordination once they have located a
pair of coordinated actions (see also Section 3). 
Of course, it might be that coordination results even in cases 
where there is no unique solution that is collectively rational. This 
can be the case, for example, when one 'team solution' is more 
prominent than the others. This would, however, introduce a focal 
point solution at the level of which pair of strategies to select from 
the set of strategies that is collectively rational. This means that 
C&H's approach only seems to take the coordination problem one 
stage backwards. 
No Common Language and No Common Labeling 
A second aspect of C&H's paper is that they allow for situations 
in which players do not have a common labeling to describe the 
game. This assumption has the powerful implication that not all 
strategy combinations are attainable. As an example of no common 
labeling, one can think of the game described in Section 2 with the 
modification that player 1 does not know what L and what R is for 
player 2 and player 2 does not know what T and what B is for player 
1. In this case, it makes no sense for a player to try to coordinate 
on say (T, L), because he does not know whether T and L have the 
same meaning for the other player. Hence, Definitions 2 and 3 have 
to be modified in such a way that the set of strategy combinations 
is restricted to the set of attainable ones. When there are multiple 
attainable optimal strategy combinations, the same difficulties as 
the ones described above arise. However, due to the restriction to 
attainable strategies there are cases (see below) in which there is a 
unique optimal strategy combination and, under the assumption of 
extended rationality, individuals will do their part of this strategy 
combination. 
It will turn out that a distinction between 'no common language' 
and 'no common labeling" is useful, sWe will say that players do not 
have a common language if there is no one-to-one correspondence 
from one language to the other; they have no common labeling of 
terms if there exists such a one-to-one correspondence between every 
pair of terms. 6We will argue that a new set of problems arise if the 
assumption of no common language is taken seriously. On the other 
hand, for the no common labeling assumption C&H obtain a nice 
result for the 3 x 3 action game. 
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To illustrate the nature of this problem, we consider a reformu- 
lation of Goodman's 'grue' and 'bleen' example (Goodman, 1973). 
Suppose, that player 1 describes the coordination game in terms of 
the terms TOP and BOTTOM, while player 2's language describes 
the game in terms of TOTTOM and BOP. The peculiar feature of 
the two languages i  that what TOP is for player 1 is, for player 
2, TOTTOM until t and BOP after t. Similarly, what BOTTOM is 
for player 1 is for player 2 BOP until time t and TOTTOM after ~. 
Reciprocally, what TOTTOM (BOP) is for the second player is for 
the first player TOP (BOTTOM) until t and BOTTOM (TOP) after 
time t. 7 
Let us now suppose that players have attained a stage game equi- 
librium for the first time in period t and that the pair of actions that 
have produced this equilibrium is (TOP, TOP) in player 1 's language 
and (TOTTOM, TOTTOM) in player 2's language. In this case the 
focal point 'stick to the same action' does not work, because play- 
er 1 will persist with TOP and the second player will persist with 
TOTTOM and they will not coordinate in period ~ + 1. It is inter- 
esting to note that both players might accuse the other of changing 
actions !8 
Let us now briefly consider the case of no common labeling. For 
the 3 x 3 action game, C&H propose the following strategy: "play 
each of your actions with equal probability in the first stage. If coor- 
dination results, maintain it by repeating your first-stage action. If 
not, rule out your first stage action and the action that would have 
yielded coordination given your partner's first action; then play the 
action not ruled out from the second stage onwards" (p. 585). It is 
relatively easy to see that this strategy combination is the unique 
attainable strategy combination that is collectively rational. Hence, 
individual rational players in the extended sense should play their 
part of this strategy combination. 9 For the 2 x 2 case, C&H propose 
that the players randomize over their two actions with probabilities 
( !  1 2 ~) until a stage game equilibrium is reached and then to contin- 
ue to play these actions or to alternate deterministically. This pair 
of strategies ensures coordination i  the way it has been defined in 
Section 2. However, as the proposal of how to continue after an 
equilibrium is reached suffers from non-uniqueness, there is, again, 
no guarantee that individual players who are rational in the extended 
sense, play their part of the same pair of strategies. Therefore, indi- 
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vidual rationality in the extended sense does not ensure coordination 
in the 2 x 2 case. The non-uniqueness argument applies to all k x/;  
action games, where/c = 2, 4 and k/> 6 (cf., C&H, p. 585). 
Concluding Observations 
C&H assume that players choose optimal attainable strategy combi- 
nations. In order to evaluate whether their analysis is based on purely 
individualistic assumptions we have distinguished between 'individ- 
ual rationality in the extended sense' and 'collective rationality'. In 
the discussion above we have seen that for the 3 x 3 action case (and 
for the 5 x 5 action case with a low value of the discount factor), when 
players do not have a common labeling of their actions, individual 
rationality in the extended sense suffices to ensure that a convention 
can emerge out of a rational learning process. In all other cases, how- 
ever, extended individual rationality does not ensure coordination 
(due to non-uniqueness). To resolve the non-uniqueness problem, 
C&H implicitly resort o the non-individualistic assumption of 'col- 
lective rationality'. Another way out of the non-uniqueness problem 
is to assume the pre-existence of a convention (or focal point) at 
a higher level (the level corresponding to which pair of strategies 
to select from the set of strategies that is collectively rational) to 
explain the endogenous emergence of a new convention. 
5. APPROACH II: BAYESIAN LEARNING IN THE INFINITE STAGE 
GAME 
In a sequence of papers, Kalai and Lehrer (1993(a), (b)) - K&L for 
short - study the nature of Bayesian learning and its implications 
for equilibrium play in an infinitely repeated game context. They 
are concerned with learning repeated game strategies and as these 
strategies are given and do not change over time, they overcome 
the above mentioned ifficulty of the possible non-stationarity of 
individual agents' stage game strategies. We will restrict he discus- 
sion of the results K&L obtain to the two-player coordination games 
under consideration. 
The basic idea of K&L's paper is the following. At the start of the 
repeated game, players have prior beliefs over the possible strate- 
gies that the opponent plays in the repeated game. Given these prior 
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beliefs, each player chooses the repeated game strategy that maxi- 
mizes his discounted sum of pay-offs. The beliefs are updated using 
Bayes' rule. The crucial assumption K&L use is that the combi- 
nation of strategies that is actually played is absolutely continuous 
with respect to the players' prior beliefs.l~ Roughly speaking, they 
show that players will eventually correctly predict he future play of 
their opponent if this assumption is satisfied. As players maximize 
discounted pay-offs, this implies that their strategies will eventual- 
ly form a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. The results they 
obtain are more easily explained if a condition stronger than abso- 
lute continuity, namely what they call the 'grain of truth' assump- 
tion, holds.la Therefore, we will consider and comment on this case 
first. 
Suppose player l's beliefs about player 2's strategy are as fol- 
lows: 
P(always R) = ct; 
P(RLLL  . ) -  1. 
" "  - -  3 '  
P(RRRL . . . )  = 1 
P(always L) = ~ 89 
P(RRLL .)-1. 
and so on, 
1 is to be read as saying that where, for example, P(RLLL . . . )  = 
the prior probability of observing _R in the first period and L always 
i Suppose, moreover, that player 2 plays always R. after is equal to g. 
The 'grain of truth' assumption says that each player should attach a
strictly positive prior probability to the actual strategy that is chosen 
by the opponent. Observe that the assumption is satisfied in the 
example considered here. K&L's argument works as follows. After 
observing R in period 1, player 1 knows that player 2 does not always 
l play L. Bayesian updating requires that he probability mass of ~ - ct 
is distributed proportionally toits weight over the strategies that are 
possibly played. After observing R in the first two periods, 5/6-c~ 
is distributed in this way over the remaining possible strategies. It 
is clear that for any value of c~ > 0, after sufficiently long time 
t, player 1 is almost sure that player 2 plays strategy 'always R' 
and the chance of observing R in period t after having observed a
finite number of Rs up to time t - 1, P(Rt[FI1,..., Rt-1), will be 
arbitrarily close to 1 for large t. The optimal response to such a belief 
is for player 1 to play B in all subsequent (infinite) periods. 
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To see more clearly the importance of the 'grain of truth' assump- 
tion, suppose that, instead of the above beliefs, player l's beliefs are 
slightly different: 
P(always L) - 1. -~ ,  
P(RLLL  . ) -  '" 
P (RRRL . . . )  = 1 
In this 
P(RRLL . . . )  = ~; 
and so on. 
case the grain of truth assumption is not satisfied and 
x for any value of t. Accordingly, at the P(Rt IR I , . . . ,R~- I )  = 5 
beginning of every period player 1 thinks (wrongly) that the chance 
1 and, consequently, that player 2 plays I in this period is larger than 
he will play T. Thus, the players will never coordinate given these 
prior beliefs. 
The grain of truth assumption is, however, a very strong condi- 
tion to impose on the prior beliefs9 This is because a positive prior 
probability can be attached to a countably infinite number of strate- 
gies only, whereas there is an uncountable number of strategies from 
which the true strategy can be chosen. Any countable set of strategies 
is very small compared to the uncountable strategy set from which 
the true strategy is chosen. Thus, there are in principle a very large 
number of priors, each of which assigns a positive probability to a 
countable number of strategies. From this set of possible priors there 
is very little reason for individuals to choose a prior of the right sort, 
i.e., one that assigns trictly positive probability to the true strategy 
of the opponent9 
The 'grain of truth' assumption can also be examined in relation to 
the Problem of Induction and the Projection Problem. In Section 3 we 
argued that the main difficulty for players in learning to coordinate 
is the problem of what to infer about future play of the opponent, 
given some observations about past play. In general, there is an 
uncountable number of hypotheses consistent with a finite number 
of observations. One can only hope to make some useful inference 
about future play if one can argue that one of these hypotheses i
more likely to be true than the others. In the Bayesian approach, 
the prior is responsible for the selection of the most reasonable 
hypothesis given the available vidence. In the first example above, 
player 1 argues that a particular hypothesis, namely 'always R' after 
having observed R 1  9149149 Rt-1, is more likely to be true than any other 
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hypothesis (for large t), because of the form of the prior. We have 
seen that this conclusion o longer holds in the second example, But 
what reasons can a player have for choosing aparticular prior? 
Recall that the aim of the present paper is to examine whether a
convention can emerge out of an interactive l arning process between 
rational players. The critical point then seems to be how players 
choose their priors. One common answer here is that priors are sub- 
jective. However, the second example shows that he priors in K&L's 
approach cannot be just any subjective priors. This is because subjec- 
tive priors will, in general, not satisfy the grain of truth requirement. 
One can interpret the drastic restriction implied by the grain of truth 
assumption as saying that priors are of a conventional nature. This 
conventional nature of priors could be defended by arguing that 
players will not choose 'unusual' strategies and the players 'know' 
that the other player will not do this, and so on. This means that 
many of the possible strategies will not be chosen. The point here is 
that the players hould have this 'knowledge' in common, i.e., not 
only should a player not choose 'unusual' strategies, the other player 
should also know that he will not do so. In other words, there should 
be a convention saying that certain observations are indicative of 
particular strategies. Thus, K&L implicitly introduce a conventional 
aspect in their analysis. 
Can the above criticism be overcome by replacing the 'grain of 
troth' assumption by the 'absolute continuity' assumption? After 
all, it is the latter assumption that K&L really employ in their paper. 
The above criticism still goes through for all strategies with the 
property that some action combinations in the repeated game occur 
with strictly positive probability and it is in such strategies that we 
are interested in (cf., Definition 1). Let us consider, as an exam- 
ple, the strategy that Crawford and Haller propose for the 2 x 2 
coordination game, i.e., 'randomize over your possible actions with 
1 until you reach a coordination equilibrium, and con- probability 
tinue to play your part of this equilibrium ever after'. This strate- 
l in {(T,L) , (T ,L)  ...}, gy combination 12 results with probability ~ 
1 in { (B, R), (B, R) ... }, with probability 1/8 in with probability~ 
{ (T, R), (T, L ), (T, L), . . .  }, with probability 1/8 in { (/3, L), (/3, R), 
(/3, R), . . .}, and so on. Two things should be noted. First, there is 
a countably infinite number of action combinations that occurs with 
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positive probability and, second, there is an uncountable number of 
action combinations that will not occur given this strategy combi- 
nation. The absolute continuity assumption requires that the prior 
beliefs assign positive probability to all action combinations that 
occur with strictly positive probability. The simplest way to guaran- 
tee this, of course, is 'the grain of truth' assumption, but there are 
other ways as well. The crucial point is, however, that one can choose 
the priors over strategies only such that a countable number of action 
combinations receive a strictly positive probability. The same argu- 
ment as above can now be applied replacing 'strategies' by action 
combinations: as, at the start of play, there are an uncountable num- 
ber of potentially true action combinations that are consistent with 
the available vidence and as any countable set of action combina- 
tions is very small compared to an uncountable s t, it is very unlikely 
that a player's belief assigns trictly positive probability to the true 
actions that are played by the other player in the repeated game. 
So, we conclude that the 'absolute continuity' assumption cannot 
overcome the above criticism. 
More recent contributions to Bayesian learning, in particular 
Kalai and Lehrer (1994) and Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1993), try 
to overcome the restrictions imposed by the absolute continuity 
assumption. They show that a 'weak' learning may take place when 
the beliefs are dispersed around the true strategy being played (in 
the sense that the beliefs assign a positive probability to any 'neigh- 
bourhood' of the true strategy being chosen). 'Weak learning' in this 
context means that a player is able to predict opponent's play in the 
near future only. As a careful technical analysis of the topologies 
and notions of learning needs to be considered the reader is referred 
to the original papers for a precise statement of the results and the 
conditions under which they hold (see also Section 7.2 of Kalai and 
Lehrer, 1993a). For the purpose of this paper these recent contribu- 
tions are interesting in that they show that the conventions needed 
to ensure coordination may be more vague than the conventions 
implied by the absolute continuity assumption.~3 
Our conclusion on the conventional nature of the selection of 
priors is strengthened bythe following observation. K&L show that 
play will converge to the Nash equilibria of the repeated game, not  
to the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game. There are 
very many equilibria of the repeated game and the equilibrium to 
46 SANJEEV GOYAL AND MAARTEN JANSSEN 
which one converges depends on the priors. Recall that we have 
defined coordination as a property of a pair of strategies in such 
a way that a convention to play the stage game emerges out of a 
rational learning process (see Definition 1 above). Thus, even if the 
'absolute continuity' assumption holds, there is no guarantee that 
coordination is ensured. On the contrary, it may very well be that 
the Bayesian players of K&L converge to an equilibrium in which 
they, for example, alternate between (T, L) and (B, R), or worse, in 
which they play the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage 
game for ever. In order to obtain convergence to one of the pure 
strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game, additional restrictions on 
the priors may have to be imposed. This makes it even more unlikely 
that players have the 'right' prior. 
In concluding this section, we can say that K&L's approach cir- 
cumvents the problem of the non-stationarity of stage game strate- 
gies by applying Bayesian learning to the repeated game strategies, 
instead of to the stage game strategies. However, their approach as 
its own problems, two of which are intimately related to the issues 
we have discussed in the present paper. First, the Projection Problem 
is 'solved' by attributing a selective prior to the players. The set of 
opponent's trategies to which a positive prior probability can be 
given is, however, very small with respect o the set of all possible 
strategies. The above discussion has suggested that this implicitly 
implies a conventional selection of priors. Second, K&L show con- 
vergence to one of the Nash equilibria of the repeated game, not to 
one of the pure strategy stage game equilibria. Thus, their results 
do not satisfy the requirements of 'learning implies coordination' 
which were developed in Definition 1 above. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have examined the issue whether individual ratio- 
nality considerations are sufficient to guarantee that individuals will 
learn to coordinate. This question is central in any discussion of 
whether social phenomena (read: conventions) can be explained in 
terms of a purely individualistic approach. 
In the analysis we have paid special attention to recent work by 
Crawford and Haller (1990) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993a,b). With 
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respect to C&H we have argued that the hypothesis that players 
employ optimal attainable strategy combinations i , in general, non- 
individualistic. On the other hand, the K&L result on learning to 
play Nash equilibrium is based on the crucial assumption of abso- 
lute continuity, which we have argued implicitly assumes that some 
strategies are salient. This salience is not explained in individualistic 
terms. 
To summarize: we have argued that the positive answers obtained 
to the general question posed above require assumptions which incor- 
porate some convention. This conclusion may be seen as supporting 
the viewpoint of 'institutional individualism' in contrast o 'psycho- 
logical individualism'. 
NOTES 
1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at a workshop on 'The 
Emergence and Stability of Institutions' (Louvain-la-Neuve, June 1991), at a 
workshop on Game Theory and Philosophy (Amsterdam, December 1991, at a 
seminar at Carnegie-Mellon University (November 1993) and at a conference on 
Epistemic Logic and The Theory of Games and Decisions (Marseille, January 
1994). Comments by workshop and seminar participants, especially by Andr6 
Orltan and Robert Sugden, and by Vincent Crawford, Ehud Kalai, Theo Kuipers, 
Nick Vriend and two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. 
z This is a reasonable assumption i some settings. Examples include telephone 
connections ( ee above); the paratroopers problem, or the electronic mail game 
(Rubinstein, 1989). Moreover, in the philosophical literature it has been argued 
that communication itself (language and truth telling) is a coordination problem 
(cf., Hodgson, 1969; Lewis, 1972; den Hartog, 1985). 
3 For simplicity we will restrict ourselves to behavior strategies. It is well- 
known that, under the assumption of perfect recall, every mixed (hence, pure) 
strategy can be replaced by an equivalent single behavior strategy (cf., Kuhn, 
1953; Kalai and Lehrer, 1993). 
4 This latter notion is not to be confused with the Bayesian learning that takes 
place in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a), to which we return in Section 5. 
5 C&H do not make this distinction. In private correspondence, Professor Craw- 
ford has pointed out that they introduced the term 'no common language' as a 
convenient synonym for what we call 'no common labeling'. Thus, the discussion 
on 'no common language' below should not be regarded as a criticism of their 
paper. 
6 It is well-known that for almost any pair of languages there are many words 
for which no one-to-one correspondence exists. The 'proper' translation often 
depends on the context in which the term is used. 
7 It is interesting to observe that the coordination problem is so closely related 
to the problem of induction the players are confronted with. On p. 120 of the 
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monograph, Goodman (1973) argues that "the roots of inductive validity are to be 
found in our use of language". This indicates that it is even more difficult for the 
players to solve the coordination problem once the common language assumption 
is dropped. 
8 The language problem is not resolved by assuming that there is mutual or 
common knowledge of the two languages. In this case the players do not know 
which language to use: they should use the language that the opponent is also 
using, but know that there opponent uses the language that she thinks he will 
choose, and so on. 
9 Note that the proposed pair of strategies does not ensure coordination from 
the second stage onwards if the players do not have a common language. 
l0 Recall that the actual strategies chosen induce a probability distribution over 
the set of possible outcomes (play paths) of the game. These strategies are abso- 
lutely continuous with respect to the beliefs, if the players' prior beliefs are such 
that they assign a strictly positive probability to every outcome that occurs with 
strictly positive probability given the actual strategies chosen. 
~1 In independent work, Nyarko (1990) has used a similar assumption on the 
support of agents' beliefs to demonstrate convergence to Nash equilibrium in a 
repeated game with quantity setting firms. 
12 Recall that both players are advised to choose the same strategy. 
13 We are grateful to one of the referees for this interpretation f the recent work 
on Bayesian learning. 
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